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Abstract 
 
Climate change affects us all through rising sea levels, environmental degradation and rising 
temperatures. The issue with climate change emerges from the fact that the discharge of 
carbon dioxide creates negative externalities, which causes the market to reach an inefficient 
allocation. The European Union has chosen to respond to the problem with a market-based 
policy and established an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to create a market for carbon 
dioxide. The market puts a price on the right to emit and therefore creates an incentive for 
companies to reduce their emissions. Whether this market has had any impact on the 
emissions of carbon dioxide and can therefore be a solution to climate change is the question 
being treated in my report. The question is addressed through a qualitative approach where 
environmental economic theory is compared with the reality of emissions trading. The 
progress towards emission reductions is determined based on current reports from leading 
organizations such as the European Environmental Agency.  
 
The market for carbon dioxide in the European Union has so far exhibited some proof of 
contributing to emission reductions, but has the at the same time encountered issues such as a 
loose cap put on the carbon dioxide emissions, which has led to an unstable price on the 
emission allowances. The excessive lobbying from companies for these allowances is also a 
problem with the marked-based policy. On the other hand, the EU ETS has in some periods 
successfully put a price on carbon dioxide and companies have responded to the policy.  
 
Based on the current report from the European Environmental Agency, small emission 
reductions will be reached through the EU ETS. But the target of an emission reduction of 8% 
relative to the base year 1990 to which the EU-15 has common committed to in the Kyoto 
Protocol, will probably not be reached. Based on my findings, the EU ETS in its current form 
is not the solution to climate change, however may together in a policy mix with other 
policies targeting individual behavior, technical change and clean energy be a part of the 
solution to climate change. 
 
 
Key words: European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Emission allowances, The 
Kyoto Protocol 
II 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CCPM - Common and Coordinated Policies and Measures 
CDM - Clean Development Mechanism 
ECCP - European Climate Change Programme 
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency  
EU-12 - Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, The Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
EU-15 - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The United Kingdom. 
EU-27 - EU-15 and EU-12 
EUA - European Union Allowance 
EU ETS - European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
GHG - Greenhouse gas 
IETA - International Emissions Trading Association 
IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JI - Joint Implementation 
NAP - National Allocation Plan 
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
III 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Question at issue ..................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3. Disposition ............................................................................................................................. 3 
1.4. Delimitations .......................................................................................................................... 3 
2. Background ..................................................................................................................................... 4 
2.1. Climate change ....................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2. The evolution of the emission allowances market ................................................................. 7 
2.2.1. The United Nations Climate Process ............................................................................. 7 
2.2.2. The Kyoto Protocol ....................................................................................................... 8 
3. Theory – Why trading with emission allowances? ......................................................................... 9 
3.1. Public Goods .......................................................................................................................... 9 
3.2. Negative externalities ............................................................................................................. 9 
3.3. Property rights ...................................................................................................................... 10 
3.3.1. Drawbacks with property rights................................................................................... 11 
3.3.2. The Coase-theorem ...................................................................................................... 12 
3.4. Trading with emission allowances ....................................................................................... 12 
3.4.1. Emissions trading compared to other policies ............................................................. 15 
3.4.2. Putting a price on emission allowances ....................................................................... 15 
3.4.3. Allocation methodologies ............................................................................................ 16 
4. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme ........................................................................ 19 
4.1. Directive 2003/87/EC ........................................................................................................... 19 
4.1.1. Emissions Trading in Practice ..................................................................................... 21 
4.1.2. Lessons learned from Phase 1 (2005-2007) ................................................................. 22 
4.1.3. Lessons learned from phase 2 (2008-2012) ................................................................. 24 
4.1.4. The evolution of the EU ETS ...................................................................................... 24 
5. Discussion: Is EU ETS a solution to climate change? .................................................................. 27 
5.1. Arguments for the EU ETS .................................................................................................. 27 
5.1.1. The business sectors’ attitude ...................................................................................... 28 
5.2. Critics towards the EU ETS ................................................................................................. 29 
5.2.1. The need for structural change .................................................................................... 29 
5.2.2. The Kyoto Protocol ..................................................................................................... 31 
5.3. Divergence from economic theory ....................................................................................... 32 
5.3.1. Drawbacks with property rights revisited .................................................................... 34 
6. Does EU ETS lead to emission reduction? ................................................................................... 36 
IV 
 
6.1. European Environmental Agency Report ............................................................................. 36 
7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 39 
7.1. Arguments for EU ETS ........................................................................................................ 39 
7.2. Arguments against the EU ETS ............................................................................................ 40 
7.3. Last words… ........................................................................................................................ 42 
8. Appendix ....................................................................................................................................... 43 
8.1. List of references .................................................................................................................. 43 
8.2. Electronic sources ................................................................................................................ 45 
8.3. Interviews ............................................................................................................................. 45 
8.4. List of figures ....................................................................................................................... 46 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”1. 
 
This is a famous quote presented in the Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development: “Our Common Future” also known as “Brundtland report”, in 19872. More 
than 20 years after the publication of the report we are still in the introductory phase of trying 
to cope with environmental degradation and climate change characterized by severe drought, 
increasing risk for forest fires and rising temperatures. To that we can add rising sea levels as 
well as increased precipitation that can cause flooding and landslides. These events represent 
some of the major climate threats for Europe. One of the biggest contributors to climate 
change is the rising emission discharge of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Carbon 
dioxide, which is formed when fossil fuels are burned, stands for the largest part of the global 
discharge of greenhouse gases. This gas represented 77% of total anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2004 according to IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)3.  
 
In an attempt to mitigate the negative externalities derived from the excess level of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere, emissions trading schemes4 have emerged around the world, in the 
EU, in New Zealand as well as in the United States. At present, the largest emissions trading 
scheme is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS puts a cap 
over the emissions from energy intense sectors and emitters are given the right to emit carbon 
dioxide through coverage by emission allowances5.  
 
1.1. Question at issue 
Can the European Union policy for emissions trading, also known as cap and trade, be a 
solution to climate change? The scheme is favored because of its cost-effectiveness but there 
are also several issues connected with the scheme, such as setting the cap over the emissions 
                                                 
1
 The United Nations, Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development 
2
 The United Nations, Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development 
3
 IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 
4
 Scheme; synonyms are plan or system 
5
 IETA (2009), Facing the challenge of global climate change 
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and the non-inclusion of high emitting sectors and countries currently.  In order to asses 
whether the EU ETS is a solution to climate change, I will present the emission trading 
schemes as a policy approach for dealing with climate change and the reasons for the 
European Union for implementing it. In addition, I will discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of the scheme and investigate the question of whether it has had any impact on 
the emission discharge of carbon dioxide so far in the European Union. In order to asses if the 
scheme has had any impact on the emission discharge of carbon dioxide I will investigate if it 
has contributed to the fulfilling of the Kyoto targets. The purpose of this paper is to make the 
reader aware that, although emission trading is well backed up by economic theory, the EU 
ETS in its current form has significant flaws. 
  
1.2. Methodology  
The research methodology is conducted in a qualitative approach. The two methods used are 
qualitative interviews as well as review and qualitative analysis of articles and reports. In 
order to understand the empirical material collected, a literature study is conducted which 
presents the model of emissions trading. Empirical material is collected in order to asses any 
divergence from the model presented in the theory section. In order to asses if the scheme has 
had any impact on the emission discharge of carbon dioxide I use a report from the European 
Environmental Agency and refer to the European Union’s progress towards the Kyoto targets. 
Studying the empirical discharges of carbon dioxide from the covered installations is not 
covered empirically as this involves the highly complex task of investigating what the 
emission discharge would be without the scheme, which is beyond the reach of this thesis.  
 
The study mostly relies on secondary data from literature as well as on information from the 
European Environmental Agency, the European Commission, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change as well as the United Nations. To be able to determine the current state of the 
EU ETS, reports from the World Bank have been used as well as several articles from 
Financial Times and the Guardian. As primary data, interviews have been conducted with 
Paul McAleavey from the European Environment Agency, an agency that works to provide 
independent information about the environment as well as with David Lunsford and Simone 
Ruiz from the International Emission Trading Association (IETA), an independent non-profit 
organization working for promoting the EU ETS and dedicated to the establishment of 
effective systems for trading in greenhouse gas emissions by businesses. 
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1.3. Disposition 
Following the introduction, the paper is divided into six sections. In section two I will 
describe the background of the emissions trading schemes and why there is need for climate 
action in the first place. The third section presents economic theory from models in 
environmental economics which explains the advantages and disadvantages of an emissions 
trading scheme. In the fourth section I make an empirical study of the EU ETS and present the 
EU ETS and the directive established behind it as well as the issues that have arisen around 
the emissions trading scheme in practice. In the fifth section I will asses positive as well as 
negative aspects concerning the EU ETS. Thereafter I investigate whether the scheme actually 
leads to emission reduction based on current reports on greenhouse gas emission trends and 
projections. Based on these findings I will in the last section give an answer to my question at 
issue, if emissions trading is a solution to climate change.  
 
1.4. Delimitations 
The paper is limited to the emissions trading scheme implemented in the European Union. It 
does not asses the flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation (JI) or Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) presented in the Kyoto Protocol, to which the scheme is linked to. This 
paper is based on the underlying assumption that the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas concentration is causing climate change, a premises supported by the IPCC. 
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2. Background 
This part is dedicated to explain why the European Union decided to implement an emissions 
trading scheme for the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide. The starting point is the source of the 
problem, climate change. 
 
2.1. Climate change 
Greenhouse gases belong to the global pollutants, global in the sense that the damage they 
cause affects the whole planet. They are uniformly mixed pollutants, which means, that the 
damage they cause depends on the amount entering the atmosphere whereas on the other hand 
the pollutants are relatively insensitive to where the emissions enter into the atmosphere. In 
the atmosphere greenhouse gases absorb the long-wavelength radiation from the earth and 
trapping this heat is an essential part for making the earth livable. When humans burn fossil 
fuels, cut down tropical forest and emit more of the greenhouse gases into the atmosphere we 
change the mix of these gases making them trap more heat than necessary. The result is called 
global warming. Carbon dioxide is one of these greenhouse gases, but there are several other 
gases with the same characteristic as for example methane6. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nation Environment Program (UNEP) 
with the purpose of assessing the effects of climate change and its current state7.  It has 
provided four assessment reports on the state of the climate change and the fourth report was 
released 2007. In the reports the relationship between global warming and its impact on 
natural systems has grown stronger for each report.   
 
“The Working Group I Fourth Assessment concluded that most of the observed increase in the 
globally averaged temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed 
increase in anthropogenic8 greenhouse gas concentrations”9. 
                                                 
6
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
7
 IPCC; http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm 
8
 caused by humans 
9
 IPCC (2007), Summary for policymakers, page 9 
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By this statement the IPCC points out human activity as the cause for increased greenhouse 
gas concentration and thus climate change. Further, the report presents the consequences of 
climate change; there is a high confidence that natural systems are affected by climate change 
mentioning the enlargements and increased number of glacial lakes as well as the warming of 
lakes and rivers. The report also mentions specific information on climate change 
consequences for different regions and in Europe nearly all regions are anticipated to be 
negatively affected by climate change which will be a huge challenge for many economic 
sectors10.  As the cause of climate change they point out the global greenhouse gas emissions 
due to human activities. The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased by 70% 
between 1970 and 2004 as depicted in figure 2. The study points out carbon dioxide (CO2) as 
the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas and its annual emissions have increased 
from 21 to 38 gigatons between 1970 and 2004, an increase of approximately 80%. Energy 
supply, transport and industry are the sectors with the largest growth in greenhouse gas 
emissions between 1970 and 200411. According to IPCC, the change in global CO2 emissions 
in 2050 in percent of 2000 emission level needs to decrease with 50 to 85% in order stabilize 
the global average temperature around 2,0 – 2,4 degrees above pre industrial equilibrium12.  
 
                                                 
10
 IPCC: Summary for Policymakers 
11
 IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 
12
 IPCC (2007), Summary for policymakers  
Figure 1 - Red piles shows higher and blue piles show lower temperatures than average 
temperature (average temperature for the period 1961-1990). The black line shows the trend. 
Source:  Climate Research Unit, University of East Angila  
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Figure 2 – Global anthropogenic GHG emissions. a) Global annual emissions of anthropogenic GHGs from 
1970 to 2004. b) Share of different anthropogenic GHGs in total emissions in 2004 in terms of CO2-
equivalence. c) Share of different sectors in total anthropogenic GHGs in total emissions in 2004 in terms of 
CO2-equivalence. Source: IPCC (2007,) Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 
 
How do we address this rising global problem with climate change? There are several issues 
the world has to overcome when solving it. One problem is that any action taken against the 
global warming problem creates benefits even for those who do nothing. The probability for 
free rider behavior is thus great and opportunities are plentiful. The second issue is that the 
damage caused by the carbon dioxide emissions is an externality in both space and time. Two 
mitigation strategies to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases have been considered, 
emission charges and emission trading, since these are the most cost-effective strategies. In 
the beginning of the climate-change policy option negotiations, Europe favored emission 
charges, while the United States favored emissions trading. In the end the choice fell on 
emissions trading which now is a tool incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol, an international 
agreement on controlling greenhouse gases. Although this tool was favored by the United 
States in the beginning, theUS have still failed to ratify the agreement which could be seen as 
a possible free-rider effect13.  
 
                                                 
13
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
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2.2. The evolution of the emission allowances market 
The United States was the first country to introduce the market-based policy with trading with 
emission allowances. The idea was born at the University of Toronto in 1960 by J.H Dale14. 
The first major program for emissions trading was introduced in 1976 by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In 1990, “The Clean Air Act Amendments” 
introduced a trading program for sulfur dioxide with the purpose of reducing acid rain and 
smog, which were followed by several other trading programs for emission allowances in the 
United States15. The same year scientists started to warn about consequences from global 
warming and an international movement began to emerge requiring countries to lower their 
emission discharges of greenhouse gases.  
 
2.2.1. The United Nations Climate Process  
Since it does not matter where greenhouse gases enter the atmosphere, an answer to the 
climate change problem needs to be global. After the first report released by IPCC in 1990, 
which highlighted the rising problem with climate change, the world gathered in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 to find a solution. A climate convention, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the result which can be seen as the 
framework for the United Nations climate process16.  
 
“The ultimate objective of the Convention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate 
system”17.  
 
Since the climate convention is a frame convention it did not include any binding targets for 
emission reductions, it simply encourages reductions. Non-binding targets were presented for 
the industrialized countries in Appendix 1, therefore also called the Annex-1 countries, to 
stabilize their emissions discharge by the year 2000 so that they did not exceed the emission 
discharge level present in 1990. The European Union promoted binding targets but the United 
States, at the same time opposed such binding targets. The UNFCCC entered into force in 
                                                 
14
 Phil (2007) 
15
 Lohmann (2006) 
16
 Warlenius (2008) 
17
 UNFCCC; http://unfccc.int/press/fact_sheets/items/4978.php 
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1994 and since then summit meetings under the convention are held every year called 
conference of the parties (COP), and the latest meeting was held in Copenhagen 2009.  
 
2.2.2. The Kyoto Protocol 
During the conference of the parties in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 the parties agreed to add the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The 
Protocol contains quantified and binding targets for emission reductions for 38 countries 
presented in Appendix B, therefore also called the Annex-B countries. In total, these countries 
were to reduce the emission discharge of greenhouse gases with 5.2% below 1990 levels 
between 2008-2012. The United States did not accept the protocol, but after Russia ratified 
the protocol in 2005 it entered into force18.  The protocol has so far been ratified by 184 
parties compared to the 192 parties supporting UNFCCC19. Under the Kyoto Protocol the EU-
15, the 15 member states pre 2004 in the European Union, committed to reduce emissions 
between 2008-2012 by 8% below the emissions in 1990. The target has been divided into 
differentiated national emission targets which are binding under the EU law. The whole 
European Union, EU-27, does not have a common target since the Kyoto Protocol was 
ratified before these additional countries, also called EU-12, joined the European Union20.The 
Kyoto protocol has established three market based mechanisms as means for countries to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions alongside with national measures. A country can either 
buy emission allowances or invest in special UN-approved projects abroad which are assumed 
to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases or increase the absorption of carbon dioxide. 
These foreign-based projects fall within two categories, Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). CDM-projects are carried out in countries not 
participating in the emission trading system, often developing countries. JI-projects on the 
other hand, are carried out in industrialized countries with the focus on Eastern Europe21. 
These mechanisms are said to promote green investment as well as being a cost-effective way 
for the parties to reach their emission reduction targets. The Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period ends in 2012 and after that new negotiations are required to establish a new 
international agreement22. 
                                                 
18
 Warlenius (2008) 
19
 UNFCCC; http://unfccc.int/press/fact_sheets/items/4978.php 
20
 EEA (2009), GHG emission trends and projections in Europe 2009 
21
 Lohmann (2006) 
22
 UNFCCC; http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
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3. Theory – Why trading with emission allowances? 
The aim of this section is to explain in an economical context why environmental problems 
exist and introduce the market-based policy solution to the problem. This knowledge derived 
here will be used to explain why trading with emission allowances is the chosen policy to deal 
with climate change in the EU.  
 
3.1. Public Goods 
Clean air is an environmental resource that is a public good. The chief characteristics of 
public goods are “non–excludability” and “indivisible consumption”. Non-excludability 
means that once the resource is provided, even those who fail to pay for the good cannot be 
excluded from its consumption. It is either very expensive or very difficult to exclude 
someone from consuming. Indivisible consumption means that one person’s consumption of 
the good does not diminish the amount available for others23. Public goods are hard to handle 
in a market economy. Since the public has free access to these resources there are behaviors 
that lead to excessive use of them. This phenomenon is called “The tragedy of the commons” 
- a phenomenon which is too often observable in society and is exactly what happened when 
clean air became a dump for greenhouse gases. When the capacity for greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere is reached the emissions should be limited. But because the individual rational is 
opposed to the collective rational the resource is consumed until it is totally exhausted. This is 
because the benefit of emitting additional greenhouse gases falls on the emitter while the costs 
are shared by others and these costs are difficult to estimate. The tragedy of the commons 
leads to mismanagement of environmental resources such as clean air. One solution to the 
problem is to install a superior institution which will limit the individuals’ use of the resource 
when the resource capacity is reached24.  
  
3.2. Negative externalities 
The costs that are shared by others and do not fall on the individual emitter when producing or 
consuming the good are called negative externalities. A negative externality is a market 
failure since the market allocation is not efficient. A negative externality arises when one 
agent’s welfare in the market does not depend only on the agent’s own actions, but also on 
                                                 
23
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
24
 Phil (2007) 
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other agents’ actions. The agent is thus negatively affected by other agents’ actions. 
Externalities often exist when property rights are poorly defined or absent, for example as 
with public goods as mentioned above. Resources such as air, to which the public has free 
access and where no one owns or controls the resource, create opportunities that can produce 
negative externalities. External costs arise when the producer on the market maximizes the 
producer surplus without taking into account the social cost for the production, the negative 
externality of emission discharges. Since the cost is external there are no incentives to reduce 
the emissions25. Historical property rights have been introduced to mitigate the effect of the 
tragedy of the commons26. 
 
3.3. Property rights 
The purpose with introducing property rights is to change the incentive structure that arises in 
the tragedy of the commons dilemma with public goods which leads to mismanagement of  
resources. When individuals or companies are given property rights, the incentives are 
changed since now it is only the individual or the company who carries both the benefits and 
costs for the resource. The private decision makers will choose to solve the problem on their 
own. Since individuals are assumed to act rational they will take better care of the resources 
than they would if they acted collectively27.Three main characteristics are required for a 
property right to be able to produce an efficient allocation:  
 
• Excludability – All benefits and costs accrued as a result from owning and using the 
resource should fall on the owner 
• Transferability – All property rights should be transferable from one owner to another in 
voluntary exchange.  
• Enforceability– Property rights should be secured from involuntary seizure28. 
 
But property rights are not always the best solution to the tragedy of the commons. Widely 
spread environmental damages such as those arising from carbon dioxide emission are 
characterized by special features which may introduce disadvantages to the property rights-
solution.  
                                                 
25
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
26
 Phil (2007) 
27
 Phil (2007) 
28
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009)  
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3.3.1. Drawbacks with property rights 
Phil (2007) describes three drawbacks with private property rights which are issues related to 
their distribution, transaction and implementation costs, and their long-term sustainability: 
 
• Fair distribution – The initial distribution of the property rights is a potential source of 
conflicts since is not taken as given how this initial distribution should look like. When 
the owner structure is made some individuals may loose on it even if the society at large 
comes out as a winner.  Public goods such as natural resources are especially tricky to 
distribute although the Coase-theorem says that from an effective point of view it does not 
matter who receives the right to the resource; the emitter or the ones being negatively 
affected by the emissions. Many countries use a principle called the “Polluter Pay 
Principle” (PPP), which says that it is the emitter who should compensate the ones being 
damaged. But how this principle is going to be implemented in practice is still not always 
clear.  
 
• Transaction and implementation costs – Transaction costs and implementation costs are 
costs associated with the establishment of property rights and the negotiations around 
them. Worth mentioning are obstacles preventing agreements such as the cost of 
identifying effects from different sources, the costs of negotiations and the cost of 
sanctions enforcing the agreement. Even though there has been a superior third party 
brought in to handle the problems, these costs can represent a substantial cost. The ones 
that are given the property rights should be protected so that they can use the resource 
effectively. The users of the resources should be able to be identified and equally should 
the effects from using the resource and the respective responsible ones be able to be 
identified.  According to Phil (2007), for natural resources such as air the transaction and 
implementation costs are probably too high to be able to promote the private property 
system as a solution to the problem. Information asymmetry as well as strategic behavior 
can increase the transaction costs.  
 
• Long-term sustainability – Private property as a solution to the tragedy of the commons 
involves yet another issue. Individuals given the property rights might put short-term 
goals before long-term goals which will cause a mismanagement of the resource. The 
owner values benefits that arise in the close present time higher than costs arising in the 
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distant future. Since the participant on the market often has a positive time preference, 
biased to the present, an asymmetry arises which will cause the tragedy of the commons 
between generations29.  
 
3.3.2. The Coase-theorem 
According to the Coase-theorem, environmental problems can be solved without the 
involvement of a third party if the right to pollute is defined clearly. For example, if one part 
is given the right to pollute a resource such as a river, the affected parties thereafter can 
negotiate and regulate the emissions by themselves. When the entitlement has been clearly 
defined the problem will be solved through voluntary transfers between the affected parties30.  
From a social-economical point of view it does not matter which party gets the entitlement. 
As long as negotiation costs are small and affected parties can negotiate freely with each other 
the entitlement could be allocated to either party and an efficient allocation would result. The 
underlying assumptions for these results are that the negotiation costs are negligible and the 
number of affected parties is small. The only effects the distribution of entitlements has would 
be to change the distribution of costs and benefits among the affected parties. The result is 
that an inefficiency triggers pressures for improvements; and these mechanisms do not depend 
on the entitlements31.  
 
3.4. Trading with emission allowances 
An emission cap is said to be the safest way to reduce the global discharges of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The emission cap will decrease over time to a sustainable level of emissions. 
Which policy will keep the emissions under the cap? The policy which keeps the emissions 
under the cap with the greatest certainty is trading with emission allowances32. The principle 
of an emissions trading scheme is that a cap is put over the emissions from the participating 
emitters (firms) and thereafter allowances, “emission rights”, are distributed to these emitters. 
Therefore the system is often referred to as “cap-and-trade”. The sum of the emission 
allowances is the cap which limits the total emissions during the period, therefore the system 
                                                 
29
 Phil (2007) 
30
 Phil (2007) 
31
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
32
 Warlenius (2008) 
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is also referred to be the most certain33. An emissions trading scheme uses some of the 
features of the property rights mentioned above since the participating emitters are allocated 
allowances to emit.  Each allowance gives the emitter the authority to emit a specific amount 
of emissions. For the system to work the control authority should issue exactly the number of 
allowances needed to produce the aggregated emission level, the cap. The cap needs to be 
tight so that the emission allowances get scarce and demand is created. 
 
 
Q 
P 
Price of 
emission 
 
Quantity of 
emission 
Demand for 
emission 
allowances 
Supply of 
emission 
allowances 
 
 
As with the property rights the allowances are freely transferable34. It is important that the 
emission allowances can be bought and sold after the initial distribution because a resale 
market creates the possibilities of cost-effective reductions and puts a price on the emission 
allowances and thus the emissions. The emitters can redistribute the emission allowances 
between each other and these redistributions lower the costs for the emission reductions. If the 
authority initially distributes the emission allowances and fails to find a cost-effective 
allocation the market can correct this through the redistribution. This is consistent with the 
Coase-theorem, as outlined above. Therefore the system is favorable compared to other 
policies (see table 1) since it automatically leads to a cost effective allocation and to the 
desired aggregated level of emissions. The demand for emission allowances is the firms’ 
willingness to pay for the emission allowance which is equivalent to the marginal cost of 
emission reduction, the alternative cost for not emitting. The creation of emission allowances 
implies an alternative cost for the emission, since if the firm reduces its emission it can sell 
                                                 
33
 Naturvårdsverket, Energimyndigheten (2004) 
34
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
Graph 1 – Emission 
allowances set the 
quantity of emission. The 
demand curve 
determines the price of 
emission. Source: 
Mankiw (2007) 
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the emission allowances on the emission trading market to a company that needs to cover its 
own emissions. This alternative cost creates incentives for the emitters to reduce their 
emission level if the marginal cost for reduction is lower than the price of the emission 
allowance on the market. The emitters who can lower their emission levels at the lowest 
internal reduction cost will do so, and the emitters struggling to hold down their emissions to 
the entitled level, covered by allowances, can buy excess allowances on the market35. At the 
end of each trading period, the emitter with emissions not covered by allowances will face 
sanctions36.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Phil (2007) 
36
 Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
Graph 2- Cost-effectiveness and emissions trading. MC1 and MC2 represent the marginal cost of emissions 
reduction for two sources. Suppose a cap is put over the emissions so that 15 units of emissions are allowed. 
The first source receives 7 allowances and the second ends up with 8, which means that the first source 
needs to control 8 units of emissions and the second source 7 units (Point A).At this allocation there is an 
incentive to trade since the marginal cost of controlling the emissions is higher for the second source (C) 
than for the first source (A) The second source would be better off buying an allowance from the first source 
to a price lower than C. At the same time the first source would be better off selling the allowance for a 
price higher than A . Trade would occur until we reach point B were the first source controls 10 units (and 
has 5 allowances) and the second source controls 5 (and has 10 allowances). The marginal cost of control 
is equalized for all emitters  Source: Tietenberg & Lewis (2009) 
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3.4.1. Emissions trading compared to other policies 
Emission trading is in favor since it leads to quantifiable emission reductions through the cap 
and the policy is cost-effective because of the tradable emission allowances. The tradable 
emission allowances also imply that the lower-cost abatements happen first. Emission 
standards, a legal limit on the amount each company is allowed to emit, is not cost-effective 
since the policy does not minimize the total cost of emission reduction. The emission 
reduction has to occur for each company until it reaches the legal limit no matter how costly 
(instead of buying an emission allowances and let another company reduce their emissions at 
a lower cost). Emission charges on the other hand is a cost-effective approach since each 
company will control its emissions as long as this cost is lower than the emission charge. As 
long as the control authority imposes the same emission charge on all companies the resulting 
emission reductions are made with the least cost. Each company will control its emissions 
until the marginal cost of reduction is equal to the emission charge. The drawback with 
emission charges is that each level of emission charge leads to some emission reduction but it 
is impossible to know the quantity of this reduction, unless the control authority knows all 
companies’ cost of emission reductions37.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2. Putting a price on emission allowances 
What will the price on an emission allowance be? The possibility to trade the emission 
allowance in the resale market puts a price on the right to emit a specific amount. As with 
other markets the price on the emission allowance will be determined through supply and 
demand as depicted in graph 1. The price on the emission allowances is important since the 
higher the price, the higher the incentives become for the companies to cut their emissions, 
                                                 
37
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Policy Quantifiable emissions  
reductions 
Cost-
effective 
Emission standards –  
“command and control” 
Yes No 
Emission charges - tax No Yes 
Emissions trading Yes Yes 
Table 1 - Overview of 
different policy 
measures to fight 
climate change. 
Source: Tietenberg & 
Lewis (2009) 
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since investing in green technology and reducing emissions will be cheaper than buying extra 
allowances covering emissions. If the marginal cost of reduction is lower than the alternative 
cost, selling the emission allowance makes economic sense. The supply of emission 
allowances has to be lower than the demand for emission reductions to become reality, e.g. 
the cap has to be lower than current emissions38. If firms are awarded exactly the amount of 
emission allowances they need to cover all their emission discharges, the demand will be 
zero. The scarcity of emission allowances increases the price on goods and services requiring 
large emissions, which leads to decreased demand for these goods and services. This also 
causes competitive advantages for carbon efficient goods and services39. In the market, the 
price of the emission right will be the marginal reduction cost for the emission (see graph 2). 
The relevant question is then what determines the marginal reduction cost of emissions? 
There are several determinants but one key factor concerns the technological aspects.  In the 
EU ETS, the price of emission allowance is also influenced by the other mechanisms in the 
trading scheme, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism, since these 
mechanisms affect the choices of the emitting firms, whether to emit or not. The price of the 
emission allowance is furthermore affected by the general economic condition40.  
 
3.4.3. Allocation methodologies 
There are several advantages with emissions trading and the associated resale market for the 
emission allowances. But how should these emission allowances be distributed initially? The 
biggest difference between different emission trading schemes is often a question about the 
allocation of the emission allowances41.There are two main principles for allocating: “free 
distribution” also called the soft version or grand fathering42, or “auctioning” also called the 
hard version.  
 
In the soft version the authority distributes the emission allowances to the polluter for free, 
often based on historic emission levels. Free distribution thus violates the Polluter Pays 
Principle (PPP) in the initial allocation. The companies who get the allowances can thereafter 
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pollute for free while others need to buy allowances. Once the allowances are resold in the 
resale market the system gradually transforms to the Polluter Pays Principle.  
 
In the hard version the authority sells the emission allowances through an auction and the 
polluters have to initially pay for their allowances. The auction itself can be conducted in 
different ways: the authority can sell the allowances for one unit price or alternatively price 
discriminate. The auction allocation method fulfils the Polluter Pays Principle more precisely. 
There are several other arguments speaking for auctioning. Auctioning is said to be more cost-
effective since the ones buying the emission allowances initially are the ones with the highest 
marginal cost for emission reductions. Their willingness to pay for the emission allowances is 
higher than the ones not bidding for the allowances. The marginal cost for the ones not 
bidding is lower, indicating that for them it is less expensive to actually cut emissions than 
buying allowances.  
 
With the free allocation version, the allowances first have to be distributed in the resale 
market to become a cost effective approach. If the transaction costs in the resale market are 
high this also speaks for the auctioning allocation method. With auctioning the polluter gets 
an actual cost for the emissions upfront, which can lead to greater incentives to actually 
reduce the emissions. With the free allocation, the price mechanism is slower since the price 
of an emission allowance is merely an alternative costs and there are no costs involved 
directly. Further, free allocation may also reduce the dynamic in the market. Old polluters 
tend to be the ones ending up with emission rights and the future new polluters need to buy 
their allowances on the resale market to be able to enter the market. This barrier to enter the 
market might disturb the development of the sector, if old polluters do not want to sell their 
allowances43. The lobbying from the companies side to get as many emission allowances as 
possible and thus create a monopoly position on the emission allowance market attracts 
resources and efforts44. The opportunity cost of these resources and efforts are the social cost 
of the implementation of an emissions trading scheme. Auctioning also changes the structure 
in the polluting sectors, since the final cost for emitting is higher. With auctioning, less 
profitable companies would be forced to leave the market and thus promote the expansion of 
other less polluting sectors. A last argument for auctioning is that the authority can use the 
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income earned from the auctions to reduce other taxes in the society and consequently reduce 
the welfare loss they cause.  
 
In sum, free allocation favors the old polluters, who would otherwise – with great certainty – 
lobby against the emission trading solution. Therefore you can suspect that the method of free 
allocation has been chosen because it is easier to implement politically45. Auctioning on the 
other hand fulfills the Polluter Pay Principle more accurately and is more effective. It also 
promotes less intense carbon productions since it pushes heavy polluters who cannot pay for 
their allowances initially out of the market.  
 
  
                                                 
45
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4. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The two major advantages speaking for emission trading are the cost-effectiveness of the 
policy and the cap put over the emissions, which allows regulators to control the exact 
emission discharge into the atmosphere. Based on these advantages the European Union 
decided to implement an emissions trading scheme to fulfill the commitments made in the 
Kyoto Protocol and the climate goals set by the European Union.  
 
4.1. Directive 2003/87/EC 
In June 2000, the European Commission launched the first European Climate Change 
Program (ECCP 1) which includes a number of  EU-wide policies and measures to implement 
the Kyoto Protocol, such as the Carbon Capture and Storage Directive and the Effort Sharing 
Directive. Most of these Common and Coordinated Policies and Measures (CCPM) take the 
form of directives and one of these CCPMs is the EU ETS46. The proposal for trading with 
emission allowances for greenhouse gases was placed by the European Commission in the 
autumn of 2001 and the Directive (2003/87/EC) entered into force in the summer of 200347. 
Since it was adopted as a directive it had to be translated into national legislation by all 
member states in the European Union48. The directive is compatible with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The subject at matter is 
presented as follows: 
 
“This Directive establishes a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within 
the Community in order to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective 
and economically efficient manner”49. 
 
The directive aims to contribute to the fulfilling of the Kyoto Protocol where the EU-15 made 
the binding commitment to reduce the aggregated anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases by 8% compared to 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012.  Further, the directive states 
that a European emission trading market will achieve this more effectively with the least 
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possible diminution of economic development and employment and that it will encourage the 
use of more energy-efficient technologies. 
 
“The EU ETS should allow the European Union to achieve its emission reduction target 
under the Kyoto Protocol at a cost of below 0,1% of GDP, significantly less than would 
otherwise be the case50” 
 
The directive defines an allowance as the right to emit one ton carbon dioxide equivalent. One 
ton carbon dioxide equivalent is one metric ton of carbon dioxide or any other greenhouse gas 
with the equivalent global warming potential. The greenhouse gases included in the scheme 
are presented in Annex II to the Directive, and these are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride51.  
 
The EU ETS started its operations in January 2005. The scheme’s first trading period was 
between 2005-2007, which was viewed as a trial phase, a phase of learning by doing. The 
second trading period started in 2008 and ends in 2012. The second trade period coincides 
with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS only covers carbon 
dioxide emissions at the moment, and thus not all greenhouse gases referred to in the 
Directive52. About 10’000 installations in the energy and industrial sector are covered in the 
EU ETS, which collectively corresponds to approximately half of the European Union’s total 
carbon dioxide emissions in 200853. The included sectors are large stationary sources 
including power and heat generators, oil refineries and installations for the production of 
cement, ceramic and pulp and paper among others. Residential, agriculture, transport and 
waste sectors are not covered in the emissions trading system54. As a result of the Directive, 
the installations in the mentioned sectors above need a permit for its emissions of all six 
greenhouse gases covered by the Directive. The permit states that the installation can monitor 
and report the plant’s emissions. National Allocation Plans (NAPs) need to be prepared by 
each member state before each trading period. The allocation plans include the total quantity 
of allowances that will be available during the trading period and the rules for allocating them 
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among the installations (e.g. using benchmarks, historic emissions or projected emissions)55. 
The plans need to be approved by the commission.  
 
The operators need to report their emission discharge of carbon dioxide each year. An 
emission allowance can be saved to the next phase, and this mechanism is called banking. If 
an operator does not have sufficient allowances to cover the emission discharges, it will be 
liable for an excess emissions penalty. Since 2008, the excess emissions penalty is 100 Euro 
per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. In the upcoming period the installation needs to obtain 
the extra amount of allowances it lacked in the previous period to cover its shortfall. An 
installation that manages to reduce its emissions can sell any excess allowances and 
installations unable to reduce can buy these emission rights. As presented above, the resale 
market creates the possibility of cost-effective reductions56. Directive 2004/101/EC links the 
EU ETS with the flexible mechanisms presented in the Kyoto Protocol57. This means that the 
EU ETS is a hybrid pollution trading system which consists of both emissions trading and 
trading in project based credits obtained from JI and CDM. The system is trying to make these 
two mechanisms mutually exchangeable which ultimately leads to an extremely complex 
trading system58. 
 
4.1.1. Emissions Trading in Practice 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is the largest market in the world for 
emissions trading covering several countries and sectors59. Only businesses are covered in the 
scheme but individuals, institutions and non-governmental organizations are free to buy and 
sell emission allowances in the market60. The transactions in the system are either conducted 
by a broker, through an exchange, or directly between a seller and a buyer. Most of the trades 
are covered by brokers. The leading stock exchange is the European Climate Exchange in 
London, but there are other exchange places such as NordPool in Oslo. The emissions 
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allowances are traded in the spot market, as well as the future market where most of the trades 
occur61.  
 
4.1.2. Lessons learned from Phase 1 (2005-2007) 
The EU ETS is being implemented in phases also called trading periods with the first period 
starting from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007. This first phase was viewed as a trial 
phase of “learning by doing” and its purpose was to establish the necessary infrastructure for 
monitoring, reporting and verifying the actual emissions from the installations covered to 
prepare for the second phase coinciding with the Kyoto commitment62. Several issues were 
encountered during the first phase of the EU ETS. 
 
The National Allocation Plans (NAPs) are made by each member state according to criteria 
determined by European Commission guidelines. This gives countries great freedom in the 
allocation process and in the first period the allocation of emission allowances varied widely 
between countries, especially in regard to the treatment of new sources. The differences in the 
way the allocation of emission allowances was treated may have resulted in competitive 
disadvantages between new entrants and current installations in the trading scheme as well as 
between installations outside the trading scheme.  
 
The total allocation of emission allowances is important since it defines the cap. Therefore it 
is important that emission allowances are scarce so that a resale market is established which 
forces emission reduction activities. During the first phase there were several indicators 
showing that the allocation of emission allowances was too generous. One of these indicators 
is the price development on emission allowances, which can be seen in graph 3 which shows 
the development of the EU Emission Allowance spot market between 2005 and 2009. When 
the first report on verified emission data was published in 2006, the price on the emission 
allowances fell from 30 to 10 Euros in the spot market. Shortly after, the price fell to under 1 
Euro which indicates an excess supply of emission allowances. Emission allowances also 
became worthless since they could not be saved to the next trading period. The price fall 
could be seen as an indication of successful reductions which had been forced by the market, 
however most researchers agree that the allocation was too generous. On the other hand the 
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price fall is an indication that the market worked and reacted correctly to an over-supply of 
emission allowances. 
 
A reason for the excess supply is that the member states are responsible for the initial 
allocation of emission allowances. The industries in the countries were lobbying for emission 
allowances and since emission allowances are not an actual cost for the government there are 
no strong reasons to keep the emission allowances scarce. It is a prisoners’ dilemma, there is 
always the suspicion that other governments reward their industry with a high number of 
emission allowances making it the best option for every government to do so as well. The 
initial allocation has in the first phase often been based on emissions predictions, which 
means the companies obtained the emission allowances they needed, since no adequate 
monitoring system was in place63. These arbitrary decisions tend to make the companies 
overestimate their need for emission allowances which results in an excessive amount of 
emission allowances on the market64.      
 
 
Graph 3- EU Emission Allowance Spot market between 2005 and 2009. In 2006 the price fell rapidly from 30 
Euros to 10 Euros and shortly thereafter from 10 Euros to under 1 Euro indicating the excess supply of 
allowances  in the market. Source: European Energy Exchange. 
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Another issue encountered in the first phase is the emission allowances’ effect on the energy 
price and the windfall profits in this sector. The emission allowances lead to an increase in the 
energy price which is a problem for energy intense industries in the European Union since this 
directly affects their international competitiveness. On the other hand, it is also a desired 
effect that the true production cost is visible in the price and if we tried to neutralize this 
effect the system would be useless. The debate about the windfall profits mostly focuses on 
the fact that the energy producers received the emission allowances for free yet they increase 
the price on energy. The solution would be to shift the allocation methodology towards 
auctioning.65 In phase three of the EU ETS a greater fraction of the allowances will be 
auctioned out, see 4.1.1 The evolution of the EU ETS.  
 
4.1.3. Lessons learned from phase 2 (2008-2012) 
The European Commission has pointed out that the first phase was a trial phase and in the 
second period stricter caps than in the first trading period were enforced which is anticipated 
to lead to a stabilization of the carbon price. The volume of emissions allowances emitted was 
cut to 6.5% below the 2005 levels, ensuring emission reductions will take place66. The 
availability of verified emission data from the first phase also ensures that the cap on National 
Allocation Plans will not be set too high67. Banking, i.e. to be able to save emissions rights to 
the third period, will also be allowed, which prevents the emission rights from becoming 
worthless at the end of the period68. So far, the spot price on emission allowances in the 
second phase has been fairly stable at around 15 Euros, according to graph 3.  Three countries 
not belonging to the European Union entered the emission trading system in 2008; these 
countries were Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein69.  
 
4.1.4. The evolution of the EU ETS 
The European Union has agreed on stricter emission reduction targets, to cut the overall GHG 
emissions by 20% compared to 1990 by 2020. The emission trading scheme is viewed as a 
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means to fulfill this agreement70. Amendments have been made to the emission trading 
directive covering the third period after the 1stof January 2013 to 31st of December 2020 with 
the goal of more harmonized rules which will offer greater predictability to market operators, 
which is necessary for encouraging long-term investments in emission reduction. The main 
difference compared to the previous two periods is that a EU-wide cap will replace the 27 
national caps and that half of the allowances are going to be auctioned out instead of being 
given away for free. Auctioning complies better with the Polluter Pays Principle and will 
create stronger incentives to reduce emissions at an earlier stage according to the European 
Commission. Auctioning will be conducted in the whole power generations sector to prevent 
windfall profits. Only in sectors were the risk of carbon leakage is great, the operators will 
continue to receive their allowances for free. Carbon leakage refers to the relocation of 
Europe-based industries to less carbon constrained jurisdictions which would lead to the loss 
of European jobs as well as increased emissions71. This can be compared with phase 2 were 
less than 4% of the allowances were auctioned out. The EU-wide cap, compared to the 
national allocation plans that will now disappear, will reduce the complexity of the scheme. 
Since the member states do not determine the number of allowances issued anymore, 
allocation rules will now be harmonized and member states can no longer favor their own 
industry.72 The EU-wide cap is going to decline annually as of 2013 to meet the agreed 
reduction of 20% by 2020. The aviation sector responsible for 3% of carbon dioxide 
emissions in EU-27, 2007, will be covered in the emission trading scheme staring from the 1st 
of January 2012. This is an important step since emissions from international aviation have 
increased by 110% between 1990 and 2007, which is the highest increase of all sectors73. 
Increased efficiency is also to be achieved by the longer trading period of 8 years compared to 
phase 2 with 5 years74.  According to IETA, there are also discussions of either having a cap 
and a floor on the price of emission rights or making the governments intervene whenever the 
price is too high or too low to prevent price volatility and help stabilize the market75.  
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The EU ETS can be extended to include further gases, sectors as well as geographical areas. 
At the moment, the EU ETS is the largest trading scheme in the world for greenhouse gases 
but other schemes have arisen, for example in New Zealand and United States76. The EU´s 
vision is to extend the scheme and link domestic carbon markets to a global market by 
creating a carbon market for members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) by 2015 and include major economies around 202077. The 
efficiency of a trading scheme will rise with the inclusion of further gases, sectors and 
geographical areas. Another argument for extending the EU ETS is that cost-reductions are 
most likely to occur when the marginal cost for emissions reductions vary strongly between 
installations since this will increase the trading between installations (see graph 2). Extending 
the EU ETS can further increase the liquidity in the market as well as prevent carbon 
leakage78. It is also desirable to include further gases, sectors as well as geographical areas 
due to the fact that carbon dioxide is a global pollutant and the EU ETS only covers around 
7% of the global emissions of carbon dioxide. It is crucial for major economies to join 
emission trading schemes since they stand for huge amounts of the global emission discharge.  
 
Figure 3-  CO2  emissions by country and regions as a percentage of global emissions in 2006. Source: United 
Nations Statistics Division 
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5. Discussion: Is EU ETS a solution to climate change? 
The EU ETS was implemented based on advantages found in economic theory. However, the 
implementation of the scheme has not been frictionless. This section will assess advantages 
and disadvantages of the EU ETS as well as the divergence from economic theory.  
 
5.1. Arguments for the EU ETS 
In the report “States and trends in the carbon market 2008” the World Bank writes that the 
biggest success of carbon markets so far has been to send market signals on the price of 
emitting carbon dioxide which have stimulated innovation and abatement of carbon dioxide. 
The report describes the EU ETS as the laboratory of carbon markets and describes its 
greatest achievement to successfully put a price on GHG emissions. Further the report states 
that the:  
 
“EU ETS market has been successful in its mission of reducing emissions through internal 
abatement at home”79 
 
This statement is based on a research study covering the emission trading scheme’s first 
phase. The study finds that, although some over-allocation of allowances occurred in phase 1, 
abatement was still made in the EU ETS in the range of an estimated 50-100 million tons of 
CO2 equivalence80. The study argues that the EU ETS has successfully reduced CO2 based on 
three findings: 1) The price on the European Union allowances has been positive, 2) Real 
output in the EU has been rising while at the same time the CO2 intensity has declined and 3) 
Historical emissions data indicates a reduction of emissions. The report connects the sharp 
price drop in 2006 to the fact that market observers had underestimated the abatement 
occurring under the first year of the EU ETS. The authors argue that market-based 
instruments such as the EU ETS give incentives to small incremental changes in production, 
which they call pedestrian changes, and not only to large installations to reduce emissions. 
The cumulative pedestrian changes lead to substantial abatement and this abatement was not 
expected from the policymakers, probably since it was hard to assess before the 
implementation81. The IETA (International Emission Trading Association) confirms the 
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abatement and says that most of it occurred because of a switch from coal to gas as energy 
source82. The World Bank argues that better linking across carbon markets would increase the 
mitigation potential: 
 
 “A more efficient and inclusive global carbon market could also encourage nations to take 
tougher targets while allowing for more flexibility through trading”83. 
 
A glance at figure 3 confirms that a market linked to the United States or China would be 
favorable since these countries together stand for 40% of the global emission discharge of 
carbon dioxide in 2006.  
 
5.1.1. The business sectors’ attitude  
In an article in Financial Times, Fiona Harvey, Financial Times environment correspondent, 
argues that “an emission trading system is the best incentive for companies to reduce carbon 
outputs” 84. Further it states that trading with emission rights is accepted in the business world 
as the best way of ensuring emission cuts and trading is said to have a key place in 
environmental regulations85. The EU ETS has received response from the business sector. 
Based on a review of the EU ETS made by the European Commission in 2005 the EU ETS is 
proven to have an impact on corporate behavior. The review included a survey sent out to 
companies, governments, industry associations, market intermediaries and NGOs. Of the 167 
companies responding, 66% fall within the sectors covered by the EU ETS. The survey result 
shows that based on the scheme, carbon dioxide involves a real cost and that 70% of the 
responding companies are planning on pricing-in the value of CO2 allowances in the future 
marginal pricing decisions; the remaining companies are already incorporating it. Around half 
of the companies view EU ETS as one of the key issues in long-term decisions and that the 
EU ETS has a strong or medium impact on decisions to develop innovative technologies. The 
companies, industry associations and governments also prioritize topics related to long term 
uncertainty, such as emission targets and allocation rules as the most important topics. A 
majority of the companies want to extend the trading period to ten years or longer86. 
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According to a study made by Point Carbon in 2006, 65% of the responding companies claim 
to have taken internal measures to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide as compared to 
15% in 200587.  
 
Nevertheless, not all parts of the business sector are enthusiastic about the emission trading 
scheme. In Switzerland, where they are discussing a new law to force vast polluters to take 
part in the EU ETS, trade associations are worried about the competitive disadvantages the 
scheme could bring88. This discussion can also be seen in other countries planning on 
implementing an emission trading scheme, for example in the United States where the 
proposal for emission trading was criticized by the American Chamber of Commerce to be 
harmful for the American economy as well as for the American companies’ 
competitiveness89. IETA says that trading is comfortable for some companies, for example 
power installations, which have trading included in their business models, but for other 
companies trading is a whole new activity. Therefore the EU ETS has been accepted with 
mixed response90. 
 
5.2. Critics towards the EU ETS 
5.2.1. The need for structural change 
An emission trading scheme treats the global warming problem as a business and public-
relations problems put in the hands of the market where it will be handled in the most cost-
effective way. As long as the companies can pay for their emissions, emissions are justified. 
This signals that the problem is not a social or environmental problem and that a fundamental 
and structural change is not necessary. Since climate change is an anthropogenic problem, 
which means it is caused by humans, a solution to the problem needs to involve individual 
behavior directly instead of relying on economic and technical solutions; an argument which 
was presented in the Financial Times91. Around 40% of the greenhouse gases emitted in the 
EU-27 in 2007 resulted from individual behavior, from the production of public electricity 
and heat, the residential sector and aviation92. 
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 Lohmann (2006) argues against the cost-effectiveness of an emission trading scheme and the 
fact that the emission reductions are said to be made where they are the cheapest. According 
to Lohmann (2006) this way of thinking ignores the fact that it actually matters where and 
why the emissions are cut and that it will delay the transition away from fossil fuels. There is 
a difference whether the emissions are cut because of new green technology or changes is the 
social life through, for example, less dependence on cars, or if emissions are reduced simply 
through an efficiency improvement in production that should have been made years ago. The 
first reason will probably cut emissions more in the future than the latter reason, yet the two 
are equally treated in an emissions trading scheme. Lohmann (2006) argues that this feature of 
the market does not encourage innovation or long-term investment and the structural change 
needed in the society to cope with the global warming problem in a timely manner, since it 
slows and blocks the technological development by wasting resources on minor refinements. 
These changes may come too late, when all the minor efficiency improvements have been 
done. Lohmann (2006) views the EU ETS as an expensive and difficult policy, based on the 
legal, institutional and technological stage-setting as well as the excessive lobbying from 
companies. However, all policy options for dealing with emissions require verifying and 
monitoring systems for emissions. Further he blames the EU ETS to create lucrative work for 
financial centers which might have been one of the attractions of the scheme, while the public 
Figure 4 – Individual 
behaviour result in emissions 
from productions of public 
electricity and heat as well as 
from the residential sector 
and aviation. 
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has to pay the bill93. Other sources also indicate that the EU ETS may not have been adopted 
because of its cost-effectiveness but rather as a response towards the United States who failed 
to ratify the Kyoto agreement94. In this case the EU ETS is used as an objective for the 
European Union to demonstrate its independence and power.  
 
The length of the phases is another debatable issues since companies, as mentioned above, 
prefer longer trading periods in order to increase the predictability of the price. Since many of 
the companies included in the scheme need to plan their capacity investment over long time 
periods, sometimes up to 30-years, Lohmann (2006) questions if the price of the allowances is 
not too uncertain to be a driver of systematic technological change.  
 
5.2.2. The Kyoto Protocol 
The EU ETS was implemented to contribute to the fulfilling of the Kyoto Protocol, where the 
EU-15 committed to reduce the aggregated anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by 
8% compared to 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012. But if the targets in the Kyoto protocols 
are set too low, the EU ETS will not be productive either. According to Warlenius (2008) the 
biggest problem with the Kyoto Protocol and its flexible mechanisms, including emission 
trading, is that it will not lead to emission reductions. He highlights a number of reasons: the 
first reason is that the Annex-B countries only stand for one third of the global emission 
discharges. The agreed emission reductions will not be enough to offset the increasing 
emissions in other countries. As a second reason he mentions the reference year 1990 and that 
several countries previously under “planned economy” were included in Annex B. Since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall most of these countries were able to reduce their emissions drastically 
below 1990 emission levels mainly through technological progress and closure of outdated 
facilities as a result of opening markets, which means that they already made the emissions 
reduction they needed to do between 1990 and 2008-2012. Since the allowances are allocated 
based on reaching the Kyoto Target for the participating countries in the EU ETS these 
countries received too many allowances. These countries reduced their emissions discharges 
because of efficiency improvements and not because of emission trading95. In the case of 
Eastern Europe, which achieved the Kyoto targets earlier than expected, the cap for emissions 
could and probably should have been lowered in order to further increase efforts to reduce 
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carbon dioxide emissions. On the other hand a flexible cap decreases the predictability in the 
system. According to a report from the European Environmental Agency nine of the ten EU-
12 countries with a Kyoto target (Malta and Cyprus have no Kyoto targets) have already 
reached emission levels below the Kyoto target for several years, based on emission 
reductions taking place in the 1990s96.  The difference between what they are allowed to emit 
and what they actually emitted, they can sell to other countries unable to reach their target. 
Since this causes an oversupply of allowances in the market this means that the emission 
levels can actually increase97.  
 
5.3. Divergence from economic theory 
Which features do the EU emission trading scheme’s allowances share with the property 
rights solution? It is important to assess this since the tradable allowances are often viewed as 
hybrid property rights and the more features they share with property rights the closer we will 
get to an efficient allocation98. Under the economic theory section three main characteristics 
were presented that are required for a property right to be able to produce an efficient 
allocation. These three main characteristics were: enforceability, excludability, and 
transferability. 
 
• Enforceability – describes the feature of property rights that they should be secured from 
involuntary seizure and encroachment. For the emissions trading scheme to work the 
traders need to own what they sell and “interest in allowances must be sufficiently 
protected to protect investment”99. At the same time a certain amount of emission 
allowances needs to be taken away in every trading period in order to tighten the cap and 
smoothly cut the emissions towards the target emission level. Emission allowances are not 
just valuable because they free companies from pollution control but also because they 
have a market value and can enable companies to borrow money. The value of the 
European Union Allowances in 2007 was 50,097 million US dollars100. Companies will 
not give up the allowances for free and will spend a lot of time lobbying for the emission 
allowances and try to get as many as they can instead of finding efficient ways to reduce 
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carbon usage. In this case, the emission allowances have not fulfilled the third criteria of 
enforceability. The emission allowance is not secured from involuntary seizure from the 
government, since the allowances are just distributed in phases and returned when the 
trading period ends. This non-permanent distribution creates the rent-seeking behavior 
from the companies. Because of this lobbying and if the government is under strong 
corporate pressure it may be hard for the government to tighten the cap which will 
ultimately lead the government to hand out too many emission allowances. This is exactly 
the phenomenon we saw in phase one and this does not lead to an efficient allocation in 
the market. This lobbying, rent seeking behavior as well as the governments’ role in 
allocating the emission allowances points out the fact that an emission trading scheme 
might not be a less “political” form of climate action than any other policy approach. With 
too many emission allowances handed out, the government creates a market with too 
“little” scarcity to work101. The EU is aware of this flaw and will in the third period 
tighten the cap (see 4.1.1 The Evolution of the EU ETS).  
 
• Excludability – Are the emission allowances excludable? The definition of excludability is 
that all benefits and costs accrued as a result from owning and using the resource fall on 
the owner. When it comes to emissions reductions or emission discharges this is not true 
since carbon dioxide is a global pollutant. The damage caused by emission discharges 
affects the whole planet and the emission reductions benefit the whole planet. The purpose 
of the first phase of the EU ETS was to establish the verifying and monitoring system 
required to track the emissions from the different installations. But the system mainly 
allows us to quantify the emissions from each installation. It is impossible to verify the 
damage caused by each emission of carbon dioxide and with or without the EU ETS the 
cost of emission discharges will fall on the whole planet. The citizens as well as the 
companies of the European Union pay a high price for implementing the scheme while the 
benefits fall on others as well. Only with a global system we can address this free-rider 
problem, since then we are all paying for emission reductions and we all will benefit from 
them.  
 
• Transferability - The emission allowances are transferable in EU ETS just as a property 
rights should be, allowing to create an efficient allocation in the market. It is the trade 
mechanism creating the possibilities for cost-effective emission reductions in the EU ETS. 
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5.3.1. Drawbacks with property rights revisited  
Three drawbacks were presented with private property rights and these were issues related to 
their distribution, transaction and implementation costs and their long-term sustainability. 
How do the emission allowances and the EU ETS fall in these categories?  
 
• Fair distribution – The initial distribution of the emission allowances has been a source of 
conflict. In the first phase too many allowances were handed out because of lobbying from 
companies as well as due to uncertainty from the governments’ side. Since the allowances 
were given away for free, some sectors could enjoy windfall profits. The European Union 
has addressed these issues by auctioning out a greater proportion of the allowances 
moving towards the “Polluter Pay Principle” (PPP). On the other hand, the Coase-theorem 
states that the initial allocation of emission allowances does not matter. As long as 
negotiation costs are small and affected parties can negotiate freely with each other the 
entitlement could be allocated to either party and an efficient allocation would result. This 
is why the emission allowances are transferable and traded. The initial distribution will 
continue to be a debatable point because it affects the distribution of costs and benefits 
among the companies. 
 
• Transaction costs and implementation costs – The implementation costs of the EU ETS’s 
monitoring and verifying system are necessary for any kind of policy (since we need to 
know how much each installation emits). The transaction costs I judge as fairly small 
since there are many possibilities to conduct a trade, by a broker, through an exchange, or 
directly between a seller and a buyer. Through the exchanges the buyer or seller can easily 
and quickly find a counterpart. The trade volume has increased since the implementation 
in 2005 which may indicate easy access to the market102. However, the EU ETS has 
resulted in social costs from lobbying which arise from the issues concerning the 
excludability criteria and the initial distribution of the allowances mentioned above.  
 
• Long-term sustainability – It is obvious that the companies lobbying for the allowances 
have a positive time preference and are biased towards the present. The over-allocation of 
allowances may indicate this, questioning if the EU ETS is too biased towards the present 
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time and fails to cut emissions in the rapid pace needed. Since there is no natural demand 
for emission allowances it is crucial that the governments as well as the European Union 
set expectations about the long-term price with a tight cap. It is the policymakers’ task to 
make the solution sustainable in the long-term.  
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6. Does EU ETS lead to emission reduction? 
We have now addressed the economic theory behind a market based policy response to the 
climate change as well as advantages and disadvantages of the policy. Cost-effectiveness is 
the key driver behind the choice of an emission trading scheme. The implementation of the 
emission trading scheme has not been frictionless and, cost-effective or not, the ultimate test 
still remains: does it lead to emission reductions? 
 
6.1. European Environmental Agency Report 
The European Environment Agency (EEA) has written a report, Greenhouse gas emission 
trends and projections in Europe 2009, which presents an analysis of historic and projected 
trends of greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. The report assesses how the European Union 
Member States have and will achieve their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol as well as the EU commitment for 2020 to reduce emission by 20% compared to 
1990. The report states that the greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union are 
decreasing and that in 2008 the total greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-15103 and EU-27 
were 6,2% respective 10,7% below the levels in 1990. According to the report this is the 
lowest emissions level by the EU-15 and EU-27 since 1990. Further the report states that:  
 
“EU-wide policies are expected to contribute towards most of the planned emissions savings 
by the end of the period 2008-2012 in particular the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme, the promotion of renewable energy sources, policies targeting the energy 
performance of buildings and internal energy market policies”104 
 
It is important to note that the implementation of an emission trading scheme in the EU is just 
one of many policy responses dealing with climate change. This can be explained by the fact 
that is not cost-effective to let all discharges of greenhouse gases be a part of an emission 
trading scheme. The discharge from fossil fuels stands for 60% of the global discharge of 
greenhouse gases. The remaining 40% (from devastation of forest, methane leaking from 
dumps, etc) is harder to control and for these emissions other policy responses targeting the 
energy performance as well as technology investments provide a better option than emissions 
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trading105.  Further the report states that the quantitative estimates from the member states so 
far lack consistency and completeness to be able to estimate the emission savings at EU levels 
accurately, especially for newly adopted policies. The EU estimates the emission reduction 
potential in 2010 from the EU ETS to be the highest followed by the Kyoto Project 
Mechanisms, based on existing implemented measures. In 2020, the EU ETS Directive is one 
of the existing measures implemented expected to contribute the most to total emissions 
savings. In addition, the European Commission expects the inclusion of aviation in the EU 
ETS to have significant effects in 2020106. However, academic papers suggest that the 
inclusion of aviation will have insignificant impacts considering its relatively low share of 
total global carbon dioxide emissions107.  
 
“Looking at Member States projections, if all domestic emission reductions take place as a 
result of the existing measures, greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-15 will be reduced to 
6,8% below Kyoto Base year levels108” 
 
Figure 5- WEM, With Existing Measures, includes the EU ETS indicating that the Kyoto target will not be 
reached. Source:EEA, GHG emission trends and projections in Europe 2009.  
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The EU-15 has under the Kyoto Protocol taken on the common commitment to reduce the 
emissions by 8% between 2008-2012 relative to the base year 1990.  The statement above 
indicates this goal will not be reached including the EU ETS (EU ETS is an existing 
measure). The report indicates that the EU ETS may work since its goal was only to 
contribute towards the Kyoto targets work but it fails to describe how much it contributes to 
emission reductions and its overall importance. The policy approach might be too new to be 
able to evaluate its impact on emission discharges. We are after all just in the second trading 
period. It is also hard to separate different policy responses’ effects from each other. This can 
also be seen as a sign of weakness of the emission trading scheme, as its effects seem to be 
difficult to measure in a reliable way.  
 
Through the National Allocation Plans, the caps, the Member States have fixed the overall 
emission reduction that the EU ETS will provide towards reaching the Kyoto target at 
national level for the period 2008-2012. Therefore the report recommends the governments to 
focus emission reduction measures on the sectors not covered by the EU ETS as for example 
the transport-, residential- and agricultural sectors109. This statement may actually indicate 
that the EU ETS discourages the covered sectors to do emission reductions in addition to the 
cap; they will do what they need to and not more. The participating sectors could be able to 
cut emissions more than the cap but are not encouraged to do so and the cap works as a 
protective shell leaving the hard work to the sectors not covered in the trading scheme to 
reach the Kyoto target. The statement is supported by Lohmann(2006) who states that if the 
government fails to take away emission allowances it has temporarily granted the polluters the 
reduction burden will be put over other sectors such as transportation, individuals and 
government institutions110. It is important to mention that this is a static view of the model. 
The model is in fact dynamic with a cap decreasing in every phase to push emission 
reductions to new levels111. There are two conflicting goals with the length of the phases. On 
one hand, we would like to have a cap that decreases fast and cuts emissions at a high speed, 
which implies short phases. On the other hand longer trading periods offer greater 
predictability to market operators, which is necessary for encouraging long-term investments 
in emission reducing technology112. 
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7. Conclusion  
In theory an emission trading scheme is to deliver emission reductions in a cost-effective and 
reliable way. But in practice the establishment of the scheme has encountered several 
difficulties. In this final section I will answer the question posed in the introduction:” Is 
emission trading a solution to climate change?” 
 
7.1. Arguments for EU ETS 
The European Union has made important improvements of the EU ETS and has responded to 
the difficulties arising in the first phase of the trading scheme, such as tightening of the cap to 
prevent an unstable price. The EU ETS has been extended both geographically and over 
sectors with the joining of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein in 2008 and the inclusion of the 
aviation sector in 2012. The inclusion of aviation is an important step since the aviation sector 
is the sector with the largest growth in emissions and it is a sector in which the scheme reach 
individual behavior more directly. On the other hand the sector only stands for 3% of total 
carbon dioxide emissions in 2007. From the first phase the European Union now has verified 
emission data from all installations covered by the EU ETS which will lead to emissions 
allowances being distributed less arbitrarily by the governments. In the third phase the 
National Allocation Plans will be substituted by a central distribution system which may 
prevent the distribution of excess allowances as well as reduce the lobbying from companies. 
The EU ETS is slowly moving towards auctioning which will prevent companies from 
making wind-fall profits. Although the price of the emission allowances has been unstable 
and even zero for a period, the EU ETS has achieved to put a price on carbon dioxide 
emissions, something that has been for free before.  
 
There are two main arguments for the EU ETS from the theory: the first that it is a cost-
effective approach to deal with climate change and the second is that the trading scheme 
involves a cap which allows certain volume reductions in emissions. The idea behind the EU 
ETS is to create an open market for carbon dioxide and through the market economics, 
incentives for companies will arise to reduce their emissions. Economic incentives are 
necessary to encourage reductions, and therefore this is an argument for the EU ETS. Another 
“advantage” which can not be overseen is that the policy actually was adopted among all 27 
member states. The fact that the policy was implemented deserves some credit, and in the case 
of a failure, the policy has at least signaled that climate change is on the agenda. Another 
positive aspect is the fact that the companies covered by the EU ETS have responded to the 
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policy and are incorporating the cost of CO2 allowances in their marginal pricing decision. 
The companies also expect EU ETS to have impact on the development of innovative 
technology which is a positive aspect.  
 
7.2. Arguments against the EU ETS 
Despite the advantages mentioned above, the EU ETS in practice has so far delivered a poor 
result. Whether the market leads to emissions reductions is yet to be revealed after the second 
phase of emission trading between 2008-2012 which is coinciding with the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol. The reports released so far show that even by including the 
European Union emission trading scheme, the Kyoto Target for the EU-15 will not be 
reached. But this result does not allow me to state that the EU ETS is useless. After all its goal 
was mainly to contribute to the fulfillment of the Kyoto Protocol (see directive Directive 
2003/87/EC), something which can not be assessed through current reports but, as indicated in 
section 5.1 the scheme has contributed to some emission reduction. And the fact that it has not 
lead to huge emission reduction is not a market failure but more a political failure since any 
emission reductions depend on the cap put over the emissions which have been determined by 
the governments. The question is if our governments and the European Union are too infected 
and infiltrated by the companies to actually cut the cap and the emissions.  
 
Another drawback with the EU ETS is that it leaves out the fact that households (individual 
behavior) contribute to 40% of the CO2 emissions in the European Union. The households do 
not play an active role in the EU ETS which leads to yet another disadvantage that the scheme 
does not promote structural change. If we are to cut emissions in the long-run we need more 
than efficiency improvements, we need fundamental change in individual behavior. The 
solution needs to lie closer to individuals and not in the hands of a market. Therefore the EU 
ETS fails to cover this important group of emitters and different measures are needed to 
address the emissions made by households. 
 
I also question the cost-effectiveness of the scheme based on the lobbying from the companies 
for emission allowances. The initial allocation of allowances will continue to be a debatable 
issue drawing attention and costs from other solutions (although in theory the initial allocation 
does not matter). If the EU ETS is not extended to include further geographical areas the 
scheme risks becoming a substantial cost to the EU citizens. After all, carbon dioxide is a 
global pollutant which signals that the trading scheme needs to be global as well. It is further 
 41 
debatable if the scheme actually was implemented because of its cost-effectiveness and not 
just as a political reaction towards the fact that the United States decided not to join the Kyoto 
Protocol and commit to binding emission targets. The phases have so far shown that it is a 
complex task to distribute the allowances and the market has been characterized by an 
unstable price. It is questionable if the unstable price reflects the true social cost of emitting 
carbon dioxide, since the price in the first period was zero during a long time. In fact it is 
debatable if we can ever assess the true social cost of emitting carbon dioxide. 
 
“Roll up for the great pollution fire sale, the ultimate chance to wreck the climate on the 
cheap. You sir, over there, from the power company - look at this lovely tonne of freshly 
made, sulphur-rich carbon dioxide. Last summer it cost an eyewatering €31 to throw up your 
smokestack, but in our give-away global recession sale, that's been slashed to a crazy €8.20. 
Dump plans for the wind turbine! Compare our offer with costly solar energy! At this low, 
low price you can't afford not to burn coal!113” 
The Guardian 
 
If the costs of the allowances are too low, the EU ETS makes it economically rational to emit 
and invites companies to pollute more. It is crucial that the system cuts supply to a level 
which creates a price high enough to encourage emission reductions. To do this, the system 
needs strong governments who are not afraid to tighten the cap, instead of handing out too 
many allowances justified by growth predictions because in the moments we fall into a 
recession the price will fall, signaling that polluting is okay.  
 
“The markets can be a conduit, but not a substitute, for political will”114 
The Guardian 
I fear that the market will relax the governments’ approach towards climate change, since 
“after all” they created a market to handle the problem. I believe the market is not a substitute 
for political will and if we leave climate change in the hands of the market the result may be 
fatal. It is important to continue promoting low carbon products and services as well as 
stimulating solar energy or other sustainable energy sources, because markets can crash, 
something we have witnessed during the financial crises in 2008 and 2001 when the real 
estate and internet bubbles respectively burst. After all we cannot be sure that the markets are 
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more stable solutions than government interventions. And if the carbon market will be subject 
for speculative trading, the main purpose of cutting emissions will be put in the dark for the 
mere purpose of making money.  
 
7.3. Last words… 
The purpose of this paper is to make the reader aware that, although emissions trading is well 
backed up by economic theory, the EU ETS in it current form has significant flaws. I hope 
that the reader is now aware of the complex task of implementing and relying on an emissions 
trading scheme. Based on my findings I want to conclude that the EU ETS is not the solution 
to the climate change. The market failed to internalize the social cost of emitting carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere, yet we want to put the solution back on the market that created 
the problem in the first place. When we put the climate change in the hands of the market I 
fear we forget the real purpose to cut emissions and prevent climate change and focus on 
making money. There is also the question if our governments and the European Union are 
under too strong influence from the companies to actually cut the cap and the emissions. 
 
To end the conclusion whether emission trading is a solution to climate change, I want to give 
a policy recommendation: For the EU ETS to be a win-win situation, to cut emissions and 
make it profitable: 
a) The scheme has to be further extended geographically, since the problem is global.  
b) The cap needs to be tighter to cut the oversupply of allowances and to create economic 
incentives to actually reduce emissions. The cap needs further tightening to cut 
emissions more rapidly in response to the alarming reports from IPCC about climate 
change.  
c) Therefore we need stronger governments and political leadership and a clearer 
dialogue has to be held with the business sector to reduce long-term uncertainty 
regarding the changes in the scheme.  
d) The market has to be regulated to avoid speculation. 
 
Only then, together in a policy mix with other policies targeting individual behavior, technical 
changes and clean energy the EU ETS may be a part of the solution to climate change.  
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